



MILITARY SURFACE DEPLOYMENT
& DISTRIBUTION COMMAND

SDDC

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**SDDC: MEETING NEW COMPLEX
MISSIONS AND ADAPTING
FOR THE FUTURE**

WHITE PAPER





SDDC

“

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FORWARD

By MG Kevin A. Leonard
Commanding General, SDDC

On Tuesday, Sept. 11, 2001, the worst terrorist attack in U.S. history occurred as four large passenger jets were hijacked and crashed, killing nearly 3,000 people. Most Americans can still remember where they were, who they were with, and the emotions they felt that day.

President George W. Bush gave a speech on Thursday, Sept. 20, before a Joint Session of Congress, outlining America's reaction to the unprecedented attack. "Now, this war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion," he warned. "It will not look like the air war above Kosovo two years ago, where no ground troops were used and not a single American was lost in combat. Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign unlike any other we have ever seen."

Americans were told what to expect, its enemies were forewarned, and the greatest military power the world has ever seen began immediately adapting to the dynamic challenges of an era that is now characterized by persistent conflict.

The Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) is an agile and adaptive organization. And, like many Department of Defense organizations, SDDC has experienced radical transformation while supporting the ongoing Overseas Contingency Operation; the scope and size of SDDC's mission has greatly expanded, while doctrine and resources have not kept pace.

To fully grasp the change that SDDC has seen, it is important to understand what SDDC looked like at the turn of the

century. The name change from Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) to SDDC in 2004 is probably the most notable, and it is reflective of the command's growing influence and expanding role as the Army's Service Component Command for strategic transportation and distribution.

The commander at the time, Maj. Gen. Ann E. Dunwoody, led the charge to change the name. "Our new name (SDDC) better reflects our renewed support to the Warfighter and articulates our new mission of global surface deployment and distribution," explained the general.

Making the change even more dramatic is the significant reductions in personnel throughout the 1990s. Since supporting the first Gulf War, the command's active duty military and government civilian strength was reduced by almost 50 percent, from 3,737 in 1991 to 1,989 in 2005.

Operation Enduring Freedom and the build-up for Operation Iraqi Freedom further changed the command. Most notably, increasing U.S. military operations in Southwest Asia meant a greatly expanded surface transportation workload.

Prior to this point in the command's history, SDDC focused solely on the strategic aspect of transportation, moving unit cargo from "port-to-port." Even at the beginning of OEF, MTMC loaded and unloaded mostly organic, or "gray hull" ships crewed by Military Sealift Command.

Today, SDDC still performs port operations, but the strategic, operational and tactical environments have changed and so too has SDDC. This white paper examines where we've been, where we are now, and what needs to be done for the future.

WHITE PAPER

SDDC: Meeting New Complex Missions and Adapting for the Future

By COL Stanley Wolosz
SDDC Chief of Staff

PART ONE: INTRODUCTION

With the “Cold War-era” less than 25 years in the past, it is almost incomprehensible to imagine how different life was in the mid-1980s when compared to the far more complex world we live in today. Across multiple lines, life has changed dramatically. A political landscape that was dominated by two global superpowers has evolved into an arguably more delicate arrangement that is as unpredictable as it is complex, with the traditional definition of power turned upside down in the process.

Business is inherently global, jumping across old-world political lines and redefining markets. On the technologically front, we’ve moved from a “rotary phone” society to one where the power of social media can instantly fuel a fashion craze, drive a stock price up or down, and even bring down long-standing regimes in nations known for squashing free speech and open media.

Following suit, the U.S. military has radically transformed along this bumpy and unpredictable path changing from a forward-based approach with vast echeloned formations, to a modular, Brigade-centric structure that is home-based and deploys in smaller

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packages, meeting the often undefined and emerging threats that are the norm.

To meet these changes, military logistics has similarly transformed, adapting to the new way we fight while incorporating the new way we do business and the technology that drives it all. “Old school” stockpiled supply activities between rigid unit boundary lines have given way to more agile concepts of support where

boundaries and stockpiles don’t exist. Successful business practices, like just-in-time logistics, virtual warehousing and outsourcing, have been fully embraced, capitalizing on the operational and fiscal benefits they offer. Force deployment methods have likewise transformed from dedicated military lift platforms to a heavy reliance on the commercial industry. The commercial Roll-On/Roll-Off (RORO) business sector has grown as a result, and door-to-door (D2D) moves allow DOD to take advantage of commercial, pre-existing Lines of Communication (LOCs) without a military footprint or node along the way.

DOD recognized the need for end-to-end (E2E) synchronization and designated U.S. Transportation Command as its Distribution Process Owner (DPO) in 2003. As the Army component of USTRANSCOM, the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) provides expeditionary and sustained end-to-end deployment and distribution to meet the nation’s objectives.

As the Army changed its structural organization to meet the new requirements of the 21st Century, SDDC took on new functions and responsibilities by necessity. Legacy “port-focused” organizations gave way to a Deployment and Distribution E2E focus crossing all of the traditional strategic,

operational and tactical lines. SDDC took on missions previously performed by organizations that no longer exist in the force structure, but did so in a “zero-growth” environment; from 1991 to the present, SDDC’s end strength actually shrunk from 3,737 to 1,989.

While recognized by the formal MTMC-to-SDDC name change in 2004, the command’s current force structure has not been adequately updated and mission growth has only been supported through extensive Reserve Component mobilization, contracted support and ad-hoc arrangements. To retain mission-focus and to provide the responsive and cost effective deployment support needed by 21st Century forces, SDDC must permanently adapt its organizational structure.

This White Paper will examine the post 9-11 transformation in the Army, focusing on the roles SDDC has assumed. The White Paper will show how these missions are not only tied to the current operations tempo (OPTEMPO), but that they are enduring and fill gaps that arose as unanticipated effects of modular logistics transformation. It will show how SDDC’s current structure is inadequate to maintain these critical enduring functions in the near and long term and will recommend a way ahead that capitalizes on recent lessons learned, further enabling and optimizing support to the future force.

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PART TWO: WHERE WE WERE, AND WHAT HAPPENED

Prior to 9-11, the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), the predecessor of SDDC, maintained a structure that was centered on military seaport operations, the management of

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The sea change began just after Sept. 11, 2001, during the initial stages of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). As the U.S. footprint in Afghanistan began to grow, resupply challenges via surface were evident. Traditional military logistics units, storage sites and supply lines were not an option.

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freight movement in the United States, and the movement of personal property. Initiatives at the end of the Cold War and post-Desert Shield/Desert Storm aimed at “right-sizing” SDDC along business lines eliminated force structure in an attempt to match new requirements.

Traditionally, international cargo traffic moved between seaports that maintained a permanent MTMC presence and movement from those ports was coordinated by units stationed there. Military equipment returning from Europe would sail into an East Coast port like Charleston, a local MTMC stevedore contractor would download the vessel, and government traffic managers would coordinate onward movement with tendered carriers. Port selection was, in large part,

determined by where MTMC had a presence and where contracts were in place to load or unload a vessel. This approach, while adequate in a static environment with a known threat, would not be sufficient to support the modern force.

The sea change began just after Sept. 11, 2001, during the initial stages of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). As the U.S. footprint in Afghanistan began to grow, resupply challenges via surface were evident. Traditional military logistics units, storage sites and supply lines were not an option. Without a static military port structure, MTMC began to rely on commercial carriers with networks moving through established, albeit primitive, lines of communication. Small-scale movement through Pakistan, and even along the routes used today as the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), began. While there were many throughput and reception issues, the small force and the access it had to abundant airlift overshadowed surface problems that would become significant in the future.

Large-scale activity in the buildup and initial phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) forced new ways of thinking; the inadequacy of distribution methods and gaps in force structure were evident. As the U.S. footprint in Iraq increased, so did contracted and commercial support to that force. While unit cargo was moved primarily on Military Sealift Command naval or chartered vessels to the military port at Ash Shuaiba, from the start, the commercial distribution pipeline was filled with sustainment stocks and resupply, most of it in standard commercial shipping containers.

As the military force established itself in Iraq, commercial resupply came primarily into Kuwait, but soon the ports, prime vendor warehouse activities and military supply activities were overburdened. No specific command was charged with organizing the over-

all distribution effort and synchronizing strategic, operational and tactical moves. Strategically-directed sustainment often entered the pipeline without a logic that considered reception or storage capacities. Likewise, the theater transportation structure could not keep pace with the requirement, despite contracted “white trucks” that ran in convoys across the border and into Forward Operating Bases (FOBs). To relieve some of the pressure and to accommodate requirements that didn’t have the priority to compete for theater lift, MTMC commercial carriers with pre-established networks inside Iraq, began moving cargo directly into the tactical area of operations, bypassing the theater hubs in Kuwait.

The first direct shipments into the port of Umm Qasr began in the fall of 2003, booked for delivery to the pier and turned over to 3rd Corps Support Command (COSCOM) forces stationed there. To counter increased insurgent attacks on the highways while developing host nation infrastructure, the Iraqi rail system was used in limited corridors to move containerized cargo. Movement control teams from the COSCOM synchronized rail operations and a Detachment from MTMC’s 831st Transportation Battalion – previously stationed in Saudi Arabia – moved to the Iraqi port. Soon, the bulk of non-sensitive containerized shipments from CONUS and Europe were flowing directly into Umm Qasr, and MTMC was running an intermodal transfer yard, staging hundreds of shipments within the port complex and using contracted Iraqi nationals to load trains or trucks provided by U.S. forces.

Initial units redeploying from OIF were also able to take advantage of this option, loading pre-cleared containers of equipment at forward operating bases and moving them to Iraqi railheads for loading and movement south. Through coordination with MTMC liaison officers (LNOs) at

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the 3rd COSCOM, at Umm Qasr and at the Southwest Asia Ocean Cargo Clearance office, hundreds of direct multi-modal redeployment shipments were sent commercially direct to home station.

A second seaport was opened in Az Zubhair, just north of Umm Qasr, and for a brief time, U.S. Flag ship service began. Maersk Lines operated the port and used Iraqi drivers for onward delivery to Cedar II, near An Nasiriyah, where MTMC forces received cargo and passed it off for further military convoy movement.

Unfortunately, both of these successful endeavors ground to a halt when insurgents began significant attacks on the rail infrastructure and local threats forced operators and commercial activity away from Az Zubhair.

Traffic into Umm Qasr virtually disappeared, but returned two years later capitalizing on ground work that was

accomplished in these early stages. The utility of commercial movement by strategic carriers directly into a tactical area of operations was proven and, with a growing need based on Foreign Military Sales shipments, humanitarian aid and reconstruction cargo, there was a market that was worth capital investment.

At the same time, MTMC’s port-centric role was changing, and coordination for deliveries direct to the point of effect, assistance to units through all phases of the distribution process, and intransit visibility expertise would become key components of the unit’s mission. In recognition of the more holistic deployment and distribution roles, the name “Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command” (SDDC) was adopted as the official unit designation.

Focus on the larger effort in OIF overshadowed what was happening in OEF; however, the role of SDDC and the powerful commercial capabilities SDDC brought to bear in Afghanistan were likewise increasing in importance and transitioning from traditional mission sets. Initial operations in OEF were supported from a sustainment structure based largely in K2, Uzbekistan, but as the mission and footprint grew, the Joint Logistics Command moved to Bagram Air Field (BAF), Afghanistan.

Co-located with the JTF headquarters, BAF was now a focal point for both unit equipment deployment and redeployment operations and sustainment moves, and with the exception of shipments moving by air, this was exclusively the responsibility of SDDC-contracted carriers. Mirroring the concept of support used in Iraq, SDDC pushed LNOs forward to the JTF and JLC and by 2004 had a provisional Detachment stationed at BAF that remains to this day, supplemented at multiple FOBs as mission dictates. This effort was driven by necessity.

The military units engaged in OEF

were accustomed to traditional deployment and distribution methods where deliberate movements to and from seaports of embarkation and debarkation (SPOE/SPOD) were the norm. A unit's equipment was called forward to a port to meet a ship and when "their ship" arrived at the SPOD, they had personnel present to meet the vessel and ensure the equipment moved to its final destination.

In OEF, exclusive air movements were cost and lift prohibitive, yet no dedicated SPOD existed – like Shuaiba in Kuwait. Commercial deliveries direct to their destination through SPODs without military presence were the only non-air options. Initial vessel moves began as transload operations, where a dedicated MSC vessel was loaded at the SPOE and moved to an intermediate transfer port, Salalah in Oman, or Fujairah in the UAE. At these ports, SDDC personnel on the ground worked with carriers who accepted and configured the cargo for container and flat rack movement. Cargo was booked by SDDC and taken by carriers on smaller vessels into Karachi, Pakistan, with ultimate delivery via truck to their final destinations in Afghanistan. SDDC units located with the supported forces assumed the mission of providing unit shipment status/closure data and they coordinated across SDDC to get the most complete and accurate picture.

Sustainment was shipped commercially from origin, moving in containers through Karachi and into the Combined/Joint Operational Area (CJOA). As FOBs in that CJOA increased, so did the amount of sustainment required, and with primitive reception capability at many locations, cargo congestion at the Pakistani ports became a serious issue.

The only movement control structure in place was a Movement Control Battalion (MCB), stationed at BAF with the primary responsibility for military movements inside Afghani-

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stan. When FOBs became saturated, the MCB attempted to meter flow from Pakistan via a call forward approach, but without a presence in Karachi, and with multiple carriers, subcontracted truckers and a challenging road network, the logjam grew.

In addition, port storage charges being paid by the commercial carriers and detention charges for commercial containers and flatracks were being passed back to the government. SDDC worked directly with the MCB, the JTF headquarters and the commercial carriers to reduce the backlog.

While a military presence in Karachi was impossible, SDDC hired a 3rd Party Logistics (3PL) company to serve as the command's eyes and ears in Karachi, validating carrier on-hand reports and communicating adjustments in priority. The strict call forward policy was rescinded and free flow movements began again, eliminating port storage fees. The 3PL monitored port levels while providing detailed daily reports on cargo both at the seaport and on the ground LOCs. SDDC linked this information with

information from the SDDC forward nodes in Afghanistan, as well as with strategic booking and vessel information, to create a complete picture of inbound distribution. This "information picture" was and remains absolutely critical to military decision makers in-theater and out of theater, and SDDC's role in building that picture became a core mission, far different from the hands-on port missions of the past.

Redeployment from OEF via surface LOCs was radically different from the past and not what units had grown accustomed to in OIF. The absence of theater convoys and a major military SPOE/SPOD at the end of the redeployment ground LOC, forced the unit to pre-coordinate specific commercial moves directly from the FOB and, depending on the unit, often from multiple FOBs.

OIF was very forgiving; because everything moved via regularly programmed convoys to Kuwait, there was no real impact if planning was inaccurate. Redeployment cargo might be delayed, but eventually the cargo found its way to Shuaiba and onto a vessel home. OEF was completely different; empty commercial containers – of differing types to accommodate specific loads, as well as flatracks of multiple sizes – had to be "spotted" at origin FOBs in the right amount and at the right time to facilitate redeployment moves.

SDDC forces took on the key task of working with units and translating equipment lists and availability dates into commercial bookings. Constant mission changes and the lead time required to "spot" empty equipment made this an extremely difficult task. The Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) by itself was inadequate to completely coordinate moves. Export Traffic Release Requests (ETRRs) requiring different and more specific data fields were needed to commercially book cargo, and SDDC again assumed a non-tra-

ditional role, working with units and assisting them through the booking, pick-up and movement phases.

As the number of FOBs increased, commercial carriers built new lanes and rates to accommodate them, and door-to-door moves became the norm. Eventually, the utility of transloading from an MSC vessel at an intermediate port was questioned and deployments (like sustainment) followed a door-to-door pattern, moving direct from origin to final destination, completely under a single carrier’s control. This method spread to OIF as well, first with door-to-door redeployments through Aqaba and Umm Qasr, and later with deployments into Iraq via Aqaba.

Sustainment moves into Iraq likewise expanded via these ports, while OIF-to-OEF movements took advantage of the Iraqi and Jordanian port networks. While the Shuaiba SPOD still remained a large center of gravity, it was used to load shipments on commercially booked carriers operating under USTRANSCOM’s Universal Services Contract versus a dedicated MSC vessel or MSC-chartered vessel. Buying space on available vessels offered greater flexibility, a distinct advantage in a complex, changing environment and the U.S. Flag shipping industry was able to reap the benefits of the large military movement requirements. Times had clearly changed and old MTMC missions had transformed into arguably more critical and complex tasks.

The previous port management missions remain critical; however, SDDC’s role has clearly expanded. Today, the command finds itself charged with implementing best business practices that embrace the corporate sector while ensuring we meet the unique needs of DOD “customers” world-wide, and those needs do not often fit a commercial business model. The end-to-end distribution focus embraced by USTRANSCOM under the

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Distribution Process Owner umbrella puts SDDC in a position to assume that focus across the surface transportation realm. Container management, intransit visibility and integration of information, as well as the synchronization of requirements with capabilities, are among SDDC’s new Lines of Effort.

Why did SDDC fall into these new roles? Even though the missions are new to SDDC and are driven by the current state of DOD engagements, the mission sets are not entirely new. The answer is clear when examining who previously performed these missions, how our forces have modernized and the ensuing gaps that exist as a result.

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PART THREE: ANALYSIS

Army Field Manual 4-01.30 defines Movement Control as “planning, routing, scheduling, controlling, coordination, and in-transit visibility of person-

nel, units, equipment, and supplies moving over Line(s) of Communication (LOC) and the commitment of allocated transportation assets according to command planning directives. It is a continuum that involves synchronizing and integrating logistics efforts with other programs that span the spectrum of military operations. Movement control is a tool used to help allocate resources based on the combatant commander’s priorities, and to balance requirements against capabilities.” SDDC’s Lines of Effort include many of these tasks, and a quick examination of the command’s non-traditional/non-port work in both OIF and OEF validate the fact that SDDC is performing movement control missions.

In OIF and OEF, movement control at the tactical level was, and still is, very straightforward. The movement of military transportation assets and dedicated contracted assets within defined boundaries is regulated by Movement Control Battalion/Movement Control Team forces assigned as part of the Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC). Standard scheduling, allocation of common user platforms, route de-confliction and visibility functions are executed within specific assigned geographic areas. Support requests go through established processes designed for the military forces being supported.

At the operational level, things are not so clear-cut. This is complicated by the fact that strategic-operational-tactical lines are blurred, modal assets are being pushed across these blurred lines, and responsibility for synchronization above the tactical level is not fixed.

The Theater Sustainment Command has the overall responsibility to execute these tasks as outlined in Army Field Manual 4-94, but recent operations show they are challenged to do so via their Distribution Management Center staff, given the size of the operational theater and the amount of

daily surface moves.

Under the old Theater Support Command structure, a Movement Control Agency (MCA) existed with primary responsibility to the theater commander for planning and controlling theater transportation operations, movement management services, highway regulation, and coordination with and between host nation authorities. The current TSC structure removed the MCAs and absorbed those functions into the TSC staff. This created a gap, and by default, or out of necessity, SDDC has filled that gap. On closer examination, there are some practical reasons why the command has done so.

In Pakistan, surface distribution operations supporting OEF are exclusively done by contracted USTRANSCOM Defense Transportation System (DTS) carriers. Those carriers similarly dominate moves along the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). In both of these instances, border documentation, clearances, host nation liaison and visibility functions are performed by SDDC through a network of liaison officers, expeditors, 3PL providers and directly with U.S. embassies and consulates. Because they are DTS carriers, SDDC has the documentation and the business relationships to effect this coordination. Furthermore, when an immediate requirement emerges, SDDC has regular access to contracting support, working capital funding and experience in applying commercial solutions.

For example, initial ground shipments of inbound air cargo to OEF out of a trans-load location at Uzbekistan's Navoiy airport, were arranged within days by SDDC units who also met a "pop-up" requirement to move cargo by road from Manas AB, Kyrgyzstan, into Afghanistan. Work like this, in areas that fall "between CJOAs," is the norm for SDDC, but something the TSC would be hard-pressed to do without access to the business connec-

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tions, contracting and funding tools SDDC has.

Soon after operations in OIF were established, requirements began to emerge that were outside the scope of traditional U.S. forces, yet were critical to the overall effort. Reconstruction cargo – and to a large degree, Foreign Military Sales and “Pseudo” Foreign Military Sales items destined for the Government of Iraq – required surface movement inside the country; however, the established Common User Land Transportation (CULT) assets were used exclusively to support U.S. military shipments. Contracting additional support could have been an option, but for activities that had infrequent and small numbers of shipments, going through a contract action was impossible or impractical. What

was needed was a method to procure lift similar to that used by Installation Transportation Officers (ITOs) in CONUS.

SDDC answered the need by introducing the tender-based Global Freight Management (GFM) system, moving individual shipments via Government Bill of Lading and funded by the shipper via Transportation Account Codes (TACs). This is another example where modularly designed military support units were not flexible enough or given the tools to meet emerging and non-standard requirements.

GFM support is mainstream business for SDDC in CONUS; therefore, adapting the system for use in a contingency area where commercial contractors already operated was not difficult. The application of GFM in Iraq has been used as a model elsewhere, with short-term requirements in remote locations within AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM met through similar arrangements. Unanticipated mission support in yet unknown locations will surely require the versatile power these capabilities bring.

The fact that these capabilities were needed in locations other than Iraq or Afghanistan demonstrates that versatile, rapid support is an enduring, long-term requirement. In addition to the SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM examples above, commercially contracted lift and expeditionary port operations capabilities were used extensively in Operation Unified Response (OUR), after the tragic earthquake in Haiti.

Along with SDDC troops (rapidly inserted as part of USTRANSCOM's Joint Task Force Port Opening), commercially contracted barges, shallow draft vessels and labor were working in Port au Prince long before any other U.S. logistics units had even been designated for deployment.

The fact that Haiti is located within short sailing distance from mainland United States was beneficial. It is logical that in other parts of the world,

abundant commercial capabilities like those used during Operation Unified Response will also be called upon rather than waiting for comparable military capabilities that must be approved for deployment and moved to the point of effect.

In the future, U.S. forces will continue to engage in more frequent and more complex mission sets across the spectrum of military operations. U.S. forces must rely on commercial capabilities that offer significantly more advantages in terms of speed, cost and effectiveness. SDDC is an organization charged with coordinating those critical capabilities that have increased exponentially in terms of importance. The problem is, SDDC's structure has not transformed at the same pace.

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PART FOUR: SDDC'S CURRENT FORCE STRUCTURE LIMITATIONS

SDDC's active component structure is organized under Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDAs), with Brigades responsible for Geographic Combatant Command Areas of Responsibility (AORs) along with their subordinate Battalions and Detachments spread out across the globe. The one exception is the ammunition Brigade and subordinate Battalion that together handle CONUS ammo moves through the East Coast and West Coast ammo ports.

Organizational structures are built around port missions, and they have a combination of military and civilian positions, with most positions assigned to civilians. Civilian authorizations primarily include marine cargo specialists and cargo documentation personnel who enable management of a contracted vessel upload or download operation. While still a piece of

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SDDC's mission set, this structure doesn't account for the current method of shipping or the additional tasks SDDC has inherited as a result.

Intransit visibility, container management and direct support for units going through the deployment process are key tasks, yet the vessel-focused TDA isn't optimally designed to ensure the right personnel are assigned to the units with the proper skills to complete these missions. Also, in a “zero-growth” environment, the command has not had the flexibility to expand. Attempts to transform current structure have been uphill battles, both internally and externally.

Furthermore, the permanently assigned units tied to ports and specific locations cannot be quickly moved. Given the fact that these units consist of primarily civilian authorizations, large scale change – particularly when it involves locations – is more difficult, if not impossible. External documentation required to support

reorganization requires authoritative mission guidance, and because many of the changes are recent and the doctrine has not caught up with practice, validation through formal processes is challenging.

In addition to shortfalls created by an environment where commercial carrier door-to-door shipments have become the norm, SDDC units are also not designed to perform the movement control or “ITO-like” ground movement coordination functions they now find themselves executing.

Without a highway operations section, or any element designed to oversee road movements, units have adapted “on the fly” to meet critical missions; however, they have done so using a structure designed for different tasks.

The inadequacy exists in the SDDC headquarters, as well. The G-staff was stood-up from a post-Desert Shield/Desert Storm structure that minimized the need for support to decentralized tactical operations and was on an azimuth focused on streamlined, centrally directed business processes. As a result, the staff does not have the depth nor the diversity and experience to over watch the new complex mission sets. This issue became especially evident when the USTRANSCOM Joint Task Force Port Opening (JTF-PO) was created and three TO&E Detachments were transferred to SDDC.

Across the G-codes, the mismatch remains evident. Authorized equipment fielding is measured via readiness reporting systems, yet the SDDC staff had never been in a situation where they needed to field standard equipment using standard Army procedures. The staff had always relied on their ability to leverage working capital funds, buying non-standard commercial pieces of equipment.

With a TO&E “reportable” unit, that was not an option. Likewise the addition of more than 150 military personnel, many of whom were junior

in rank, stressed a small military personnel section in the G1 Directorate, a staff-code with an almost exclusive civilian personnel focus.

Other examples exist in the Operations (G3) and Business (G9) directorates that were not designed for the global staff support and, in many cases, are executing CONUS-based Brigade missions that fall within the 597th Transportation Brigade's AOR.

Recognizing this, SDDC has begun efforts to transform, but by design these are multi-year actions. The change in mission, nevertheless, has moved quickly and SDDC has adapted and is using all available resources to meet current demands, doing so primarily via the Reserve Component and through commercial contracts.

SDDC's Reserve Component force structure has actually modernized quicker than the active units, largely because the structure is exclusively military and, as such, doesn't face the same challenges the heavy civilian structures encounter.

As the command transformed from MTMC to SDDC, USAR Terminal Brigades, Battalions and Deployment Support Brigades reorganized into modular Deployment and Distribution Support Battalions (DDSBs) and Transportation Groups. The DDSBs are set up to work traditional vessel missions but with three 10-Soldier Deployment and Distribution Support Teams (DDSTs) that can be detached and employed separately from their parent headquarters, making them far more agile and capable of enabling current surface distribution support.

Mobilized DDSBs and their DDSTs have been used extensively for OIF/OND and OEF support and have even assisted with CONUS support missions involving deploying and redeploying units. The Group Headquarters are C2 organizations capable of employment in a pre-established SDDC AOR where subordinate Battalions fall under them.

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Combined with individual mobilized augmentees (IMAs) stationed across the AORs at locations where new missions have arisen, the SDDC Reserve Component structure has enabled mission success during changing times.

Without this robust Reserve Component assistance, coupled with contracted 3rd Party Logistics teams, expeditors and control nodes, the command would be ineffective. The Reserve Component and contractors are not the long term answer and the constant rotation of individual Reserve Component units is testing the limits in the short term.

SDDC must transform and the changes must take place quickly if the modern, optimal support that our forces have grown to depend upon will exist and modernize in the complex and unchartered future.

PART FIVE: THE WAY AHEAD

Successful SDDC transformation will require support from across the Army and an acceptance of the fact that global distribution CONOPS have changed and current Army doctrinal solutions are not adequate.

While it is not the intent of this paper to layout the specific details of that transformation, there are four points that are especially relevant in charting the way ahead:

1. From a functional perspective, SDDC is in the best position to fill gaps in capability, which is validated by current complex operations. The way SDDC has instantly responded to new requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan, combined with similar support in SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM, clearly shows that SDDC is unique and as part of USTRANSCOM is empowered to execute quick and effective distribution.

2. USTRANSCOM's role in support of Joint operations across the spectrum has been steadily expanding. As the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) of USTRANSCOM, SDDC is positioned to ensure future initiatives are complementary to Army end states and that Army forces are optimally supported.

Since being designated as the Distribution Process Owner (DPO) in September 2003, USTRANSCOM and the Defense Transportation System's importance in support of current and future operations has grown. This is a logical outgrowth of a post-Cold War force posture that switched from forward-based to home-based. Strategic deployment is essential and sustaining a force in the modern world requires the use of global supply chains; the DPO structure is charged with the efficiency and interoperability of DOD's network.

These innovations will surely expand as USTRANSCOM assumes the Unified Command Plan role of Global Distribution Synchronizer (GDS), formally recognizing a comprehensive planning role that will span the entire Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE).

A March 14, 2011 SECDEF memorandum intended to spur DOD efficiencies contains several items that affect future USTRANSCOM and SDDC roles, all with an aggressive implementation timeline.

While the details of these items have not been determined, the memo clearly directs assignment of Army Watercraft, Joint Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS) forces, and theater/port opening forces to USTRANSCOM, with Army forces aligned under SDDC.

This is an apparent “game changer” that recognizes the speed and utility of employing theater opening capabilities under USTRANSCOM’s authority in the earliest parts of an operation. It builds on the logic of successful JTF-PO deployments under USTRANSCOM authority over the past several years and likewise builds on the demonstrated issues and delays associated with designating Army Forces (ARFOR) via Request For Forces (RFF) or Executive order (EXORD) processes, most recently showcased in the late arrival of component forces to Haiti for Operation Unified Response.

3. As a Major Subordinate Command of the Army Materiel Command for Administrative Control (ADCON) matters, SDDC is an integral part of one of the Defense Transportation System’s largest shippers. Bringing together the Materiel Enterprise (ME) with the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) is mutually beneficial.

4. Investment in SDDC force structure is offset by more cost effective

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The opinion that because SDDC is a TDA organization, it cannot directly support operations in theater and is in no position to command and control TO&E forces. This is a fallacy; SDDC has a TDA Battalion headquarters stationed in Iraq with other forces in place across the OEF battle space.

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positioning – less stock procurement, less air transport, and less forward infrastructure.

5. Given today’s global economy, SDDC is an organization that is already linked with modern business capabilities that cross borders and political and cultural lines. These business organizations will be essential to current and future support.

BARRIERS TO PROGRESS:

Organizational change is difficult, regardless of how essential it is. Some people will be critical of actions that optimize support to the Joint Force and, in the larger sense, the Army. This criticism could delay and even counter efforts aimed at essential

modernization and this “old-school” way of thinking puts the future at risk. Barriers that could become a part of the conversation include:

▶ The opinion that because SDDC is a TDA organization, it cannot directly support operations in theater and is in no position to command and control TO&E forces. This is a fallacy; SDDC has a TDA Battalion headquarters stationed in Iraq with other forces in place across the OEF battle space.

The TO&E forces that make up the Army contribution to JTF-PO are already assigned to SDDC. While there are supporting staff shortfalls that need to be addressed (as outlined in Part Four above), there is no reason why SDDC’s TDA structure can’t be updated to handle all emerging missions and forces.

▶ The opinion that if the Army allows additional force structure to fall under SDDC/USTRANSCOM, that structure will not be available in the larger force pool or for employment in non-USTRANSCOM missions. This concern is also invalid. USTRANSCOM can provide forces to meet a Combatant Commander’s requirements in the same way Forces Command does and, in all cases, employment of forces is done in a Geographic Combatant Commander’s AOR.

Also, when employed, those forces are meeting requirements that would likely have been sourced by the Army. Finally, forces could transition to theater command and control after an employment supporting a USTRANSCOM-directed mission or be aligned under a developing theater command and control structure from the beginning, regardless of how they enter an operation.

▶ Parochialism and refusal to accept the fact that a Combatant Commander with strategic lift platforms and global deployment and distribu-

tion responsibilities is in a position to conduct initial theater opening in a more effective manner than an Army force. JTF-PO has proven on multiple occasions that a habitual command and control relationship with US-TRANSCOM, in combination with the speed of response, is far more effective in the short term than formal RFF procedures.

The utility of USTRANSCOM conducting port opening is widely accepted; expeditionary theater opening is the next logical step. The Army should invest in efforts to synchronize ARFOR with these constructs as they are jointly developed instead of “digging-in” and arguing against an eventuality.

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PART SIX: CONCLUSION

The ad-hoc arrangements that have been the keys to successful mission support in current operations need to be codified. The immediate actions that are required include:

- ▶ New roles and missions need to be formally captured in authoritative mission statements, and the process

to update TDAs, TO&Es and doctrine must concurrently progress. Initial work at the U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command looking at SDDC’s role in future terminal operations and the effort associated with the March 14 SECDEF initiatives memo already have things moving in this direction.

JTF-PO operations validate this line of thinking further. It is a fact that future distribution operations in our complex, modern world will require capabilities like the ones currently in use. It makes no sense to debate that fact; our energy should be spent on harnessing these capabilities.

- ▶ A complete structural review of SDDC’s Headquarters needs to be accomplished and gaps where the organization is not postured to support the operational construct of the future need to be closed.

The current SDDC Headquarters construct is a product of history. Additionally, the BRAC move to Scott AFB, which has been a focus of the headquarters for the past five years, has tied-down any significant efforts at change. With the Headquarters now located in one place, a bottoms-up analysis that preserves essential support structure, yet modifies that

structure where required to meet future demands, must occur.

- ▶ Efforts to examine SDDC’s global posture should continue and, if required, unit stationing should be adjusted in a manner that optimally supports modern distribution across the Combatant Command AORs.

- ▶ Subordinate Brigade and Battalion authorization documents need to be reviewed and updated. Legacy “port-based” structure must now encompass the versatile deployment and distribution missions the units are already accomplishing and will continue to accomplish in the future, all with a heavy link to commercial capabilities.

While these tasks may seem daunting, most of the work has already begun by default. The changes we’ve seen in business and technology, along with the “crystal-clear” mission focus that comes with support to current combat operations, has shown us the path to the future.

Unless we rapidly capture these critical changes, we disregard realistic lessons-learned and even worse, we force those who follow us to re-discover things we’ve already experienced.

“ As the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) of USTRANSCOM, SDDC is positioned to ensure future initiatives are complementary to Army end states and that Army forces are optimally supported. ”




SDDC

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COL STANLEY WOLOSZ SDDC Chief of Staff

Colonel Stan Wolosz is the Chief of Staff, Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, headquartered at Scott Air Force Base, Ill.

The colonel completed the Transportation Officers Basic Course in 1983. During the past 28 years he has served in a wide variety of both Army and Joint positions and he has commanded at all levels, from Detachment through Brigade.



A native of Worcester, Mass., he graduated from the College of the Holy Cross with a Bachelor of Arts degree in political science, has a Master of Science degree in business management from Troy State University, and a Master of Arts in national security and strategic studies from the Naval War College.

Among Colonel Wolosz' numerous awards are the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star Medal, two Defense Meritorious Service Medals, three Meritorious Service Medals, the Joint Service Commendation Medal, six Army Commendation Medals, and two Joint Service Achievement Medals.

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